Typically, a linguistic typology deÞnes all logically possible types and states which of these types are actually attested and which are not. The task then is to describe such a typology, preferably in the most economic way. Greenberg's Appendix II (1966) and Hawkins' Expanded Sample. Hawkins (1983) 
Introduction
A linguistic typology states all logically possible types, and is typically accompanied by empirical facts as to which of these logically possible types are actually attested and which are not attested (relative to a sample). Given such a typology, linguists face the task of describing it by formulating statements that capture the distributional pattern shown by the typology. The typology's description would normally be required to be as simple as possible, in accordance with the meta-scientiÞc principle of simplicity (simplex sigillum veri), which is widely endorsed in linguistics. The question arises of how we can Þnd the simplest description(s) of a typology.
The basic goal of this paper is twofold. First, we postulate a descriptive typological principle to the effect that for any typology with at least one unattested type there exists a minimal description, consisting of a conjunction of nonstatistical (implicational) universals deÞning all and only the attested types. No non-statistical generalizations are possible for typologies in which all types are attested. And, secondly, we propose a method that Þnds the simplest description(s) of a typology, alongside with a computer program that executes the method.
Our discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the analyses of the word order typologies in Greenberg's Appendix II (Greenberg 1966 ) and Hawkins' Expanded Sample (Hawkins 1983) as familiar illustrations of the kind of task we are discussing. Neither author has proposed a set of universals deÞning all and only the attested types in his data. In Section 3, using some results from propositional logic, we postulate a principle stating the existence of a minimal account of typologies. This principle allows us to make the a priori judgment that both Greenberg's and Hawkins' analyses are, from a descriptive point of view, not fully adequate. Section 4 outlines a method for Þnding minimal account(s) of a typology in terms of implicational universals, which is illustrated on Hawkins' typology; the Expanded Sample turns out to have a number of alternative accounts, three of which are simplest in that they consist of the smallest number of universals. In this section, we also list the possible (simplest and non-simplest) accounts of Appendix II. Section 5 is a brief sketch of MINTYP, a computer program that executes the method, which is computationally complex and hence requires automation. And, Þnally, Section 6 summarizes our contributions.
Greenberg's Appendix II and Hawkins' Expanded Sample
In his seminal paper on the order of meaningful elements, Greenberg (1966) proposes a typology of the world's languages in terms of their ordering properties, which he states as Appendix II in his article. (For a good review of the state of the art in word order typology, cf . Dryer 1995.) This typology uses four dimensions (= properties of languages), viz. verb-subject-object order, adposition order (preposition or postposition), adjective-noun order, and genitivenoun order. Greenberg notes that only three out of the six logically admissible types of verb-subject-object order are attested, viz., SVO, SOV, and VSO, while the others are non-existent or extremely rare. 1 Then, assuming binary 1. Later researchers indeed found that other orders, viz., VOS (Keenan 1978 , Tomlin 1986 or OVS and OSV (e.g., Derbyshire & Pullum 1981) are also attested, though rarely, in some of the world's languages. We note, however, that these further empirical Þndings have no bearing on our present discussion which is conÞned to assessing of Greenberg's analysis based on the data available to him at the moment of writing. (Boolean, yes/no) attributes on the dimensions of adpositions, adjective-noun, and genitive-noun, he comes up with a typology classifying the languages of the world into 3 · 2 · 2 · 2 = 24 logically admissible types. Basing his analysis on 142 (groups of) languages of wide genetic and areal coverage, he notes that 9 out of the 24 logically admissible types are actually unattested. This is seen in Table 1 , which summarizes Greenberg's Appendix II. The disallowed Types are 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 18, 20, and 22 . In his paper, Greenberg proposes 28 non-statistical and statistical ordering universals, basing his analyses, in addition to Appendix II, on his 30-language sample (given in Appendix I) which contains information also on other ordering properties such as noun-relative clause, auxiliary verb-main verb, etc. Here, we will be interested only in the non-statistical universals pertaining to the proposed four-dimensional typology, i.e., the ones referring to the ordering of verb-subject-object, adpositions, adjective-noun, or genitive-noun, since only these are relevant to our task of describing the typology.
Greenberg managed to Þnd two exceptionless universals holding in Appendix II: his Universal 3 ("Languages with dominant VSO order are always prepositional") 2 and his Universal 5 ("If a language has dominant SOV order and the genitive follows the governing noun, then the adjective likewise follows the noun").
The goal of positing universals, which Greenberg was in pursuit of, is to deÞne all and only the attested types in a typology. Operating in conjunction with one another, a set of universals should predict which types occur and which do not. Thus, a word order type would be attested if none of its word orders violated any of the conjoined universals; otherwise, this type would be unattested. Or, putting it differently, any word order co-occurrence type would be attested if it satisÞed the logical conjunction [Universal 1 & Universal 2 ... & Universal n ], which means (recalling the deÞnition of logical conjunction) that each of the conjuncts, Universal 1 , Universal 2 , etc., should be individually satisÞed; if, in contrast, a type has some orderings that do not satisfy even one of the conjuncts, then this type ought to be unattested.
How successful has Greenberg been in describing his typology, and in doing it in the simplest possible way? Greenberg's concern for simplicity is manifest in words like "In a certain sense we would prefer to have as few universals as possible, not as many. That is, we would like to be able to deduce them from as small a number of general principles as possible " (1966: 75) . Though the principles he had in mind would perhaps be of a more abstract and explanatory nature than those needed for a typology's description in terms of universals, we may safely assume that the simplest descriptive solutions would also be a worthy goal for him.
In order to evaluate Greenberg's proposal, below we list, in symbolic form, 3 his two universals, giving in parentheses the types excluded by each of them: (It is easy to see in Table 1 that these universals block exactly these types, and no others.) If we compare all the types excluded by the universals with all the unattested ones, we see that Types 4, 13, and 20 are not ruled out by any of the generalizations even though they are unattested. Greenberg's generalizations did not constitute a descriptively adequate account of the data in Appendix II and therefore the question of whether his account is minimal or not simply does not arise.
In his important book Hawkins (1983) extends and slightly corrects Greenberg's typology in Appendix II, using the data from his Expanded Sample of 336 (groups of) languages. Table 2 summarizes Hawkins' Expanded Sample (1983: 288) .
Hawkins preserves the basic structure of Greenberg's typology in keeping the same dimensions and the same attributes on these dimensions, with one exception. Thus, instead of the attribute VSO, Hawkins introduces the attribute V-1, basically in order to admit both VSO languages and VOS languages, the latter discovered by Keenan (1978) (for details, cf. Hawkins 1983: 55) . (As seen in Table 2 , no explicit provision is made for the object-Þrst languages found by Derbyshire & Pullum (1981) .) This typology, again, has 9 unattested word order types, which, however, are slightly different from those of Greenberg (cf. Table 1); non-occurring here are Types 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 18, 20, and 22. Hawkins (1983) repeatedly states that the major goal of the linguist is to describe the data most simply in terms of implicational universals. Thus, for example, he writes that "the purpose of a set of implicational universals, operating collectively, is to deÞne all and only the attested word order co-occurrences in the most revealing, and SIMPLEST, manner" (1983: 29; emphasis added) . He declares that Greenberg has only been partly successful in this task (Hawkins 1983: 27) , and addresses the problem head-on in Section 3.2 of his book.
Below is the set of implicational universals he found, 4 with the excluded types given in parentheses: 
The latter symbolization seems more intuitive to us for the following reasons. First, it can be more naturally verbalized than the former statement (cf. "If A and B, then C" vs. "If A, then, if B, then C"). Secondly, the truth tables for the latter formulae containing & (and) are more immediately evident than in the former notation, viz., they are the same as for the two-termed implication A → B, in which the antecedent, A, is a conjunction of atomic terms. And, Þnally, since in the latter symbolization a conjunction of terms denotes the antecedent of an implication, and since a conjunction (like disjunction or equivalence) is commutative, it is obvious that the permutation of these terms is logically immaterial:
In this context, it makes no sense from a logical (or linguistic) perspective to speak of an "ultimate antecedent", as it happens a number of times in Hawkins (1983) . The greater transparency of a complex universal being stated with one conjunctive antecedent is also noted by Dryer (1997: 141) . Despite these considerations, however, we shall keep Hawkins' original symbolization as it has been widely used in the linguistic literature throughout the years.
ists no set of exceptionless universals that can fully describe the typology, including Types 5 and 13, he leaves them aside, suggesting that statistical generalizations should be invoked for explanation of their non-occurrence. Thus, Hawkins writes that these types "will be predicted by the distributional principle in Chapter 4 to be rare or nonoccurring in a sample this size" (Hawkins 1983: 69) . Understandably, as with Greenberg, no attempt is made to justify the proposed universals as the simplest account. Summarizing the discussion so far, we may conclude that while Greenberg's analysis of the data in his Appendix II has only been partially successful in that he failed to exclude three unattested types, Hawkins' account of his Expanded Sample is not fully satisfactory either because it still fails to exclude two unattested types. In both cases, the proclaimed goal of descriptive simplicity has been compromised owing to the failure of both authors either to Þnd several complete solutions -a necessary prerequisite for selecting the simplest one -or alternatively, to demonstrate that some solution is unique and hence the simplest.
These objections are valid only if there do exist sets (conjunctions) of nonstatistical universals that deÞne all and only the attested types in both Table 1 and Table 2 in a simplest way. In the next section, we postulate a descriptive principle stating that for typologies such as those in Table 1 and Table 2 such minimal accounts indeed do exist. This principle thus allows us to claim in an a priori way that both Greenberg's and Hawkins' analyses are not fully adequate, even if we do not know what the correct analyses actually are.
A descriptive principle in typology
In a most revealing article, Greenberg (1978) brings to the attention of linguists some logical properties of the different types of typologies used in linguistics. He discusses typologies in terms of the number of their dimensions (one-or multi-dimensional typologies), the attributes on these dimensions (categorical or numerical), and, for the case of one-and two-dimensional typologies, describes the logical form to which they correspond (e.g., one-dimensional typologies correspond to unrestricted universals, two-dimensional typologies to unilateral or bilateral implications, etc.). Greenberg does not enter into analysis of the logical expressions generated by typologies of more than two dimensions.
Before considering the question of describing arbitrary typologies in its full generality, let us limit our attention to typologies having only binary (i.e., Boolean, yes/no) attributes on all their dimensions. From Greenberg's discussions, as well as from elementary knowledge of mathematical logic, it is clear that an n-dimensional typology (n ≥ 1) with binary attributes for these dimensions is in fact an n-place (n-argument) truth function (truth table) in propositional logic. 5 Thus, the n dimensions of the typology correspond to the n places (= arguments) of the truth function, the binary yes/no attributes of the typology correspond to the values T(rue)/F(alse) the truth function's arguments take, and the attested vs. unattested types in a typology correspond to the two possible values T(rue)/F(alse) of the truth function. An n-dimensional typology with binary attributes deÞnes all logically possible types whose number is 2 n , and 2 n is exactly the number of the rows in a truth table, which result from all logically possible distributions of the values T/F of all the arguments of the truth function. Now, let us state some relevant facts from propositional logic. For our discussion, we need only mention them rather than go into the details of how they may be formally proven in mathematical logic (the interested reader is referred, e.g., to Mendelson 1963: Chapter 1, or Quine 1965: Chapter 1).
(i) Every truth function can be generated by some propositional formula.
(ii) Every propositional formula can be represented as a CONJUNCTIVE NOR-MAL FORM (CNF). A CNF is a propositional formula of the type C 1 & C 2 & C 3 ... & C n , in which every conjunct C i is a disjunction of atomic propositions or their negations. Examples of CNFs are:
Every compound (= non-atomic) propositional formula can be expressed by means of atomic propositions bound only by one minimal pair of logical connectives: the pair negation and implication (∼ and →), the pair negation and conjunction (∼ and &), or the pair negation and disjunction (∼ and ∨); alternatively, several of these connectives may be used. Now, given that an n-dimensional typology with binary attributes is equivalent to an n-place truth function, it will follow by (i) that it can be generated by some propositional formula (= a (compound) universal). This (compound) universal, in turn, can be expressed as a Conjunctive Normal Form (by (ii)). And, Þnally, each individual conjunct in this (compound) universal in CNF, if compound, may be represented, among other alternatives, by an implicational expression possibly containing negations, or optionally, other connectives as well (by (iii)).
In purely linguistic terms, the argument above amounts to the following: Any n-dimensional typology with binary attributes can be described by a nonstatistical (compound) universal, or what is the same, by a conjunction of universals, of the form:
. A truth function of n arguments is any function of n arguments which takes the truth values True or False, its arguments also taking the same truth values.
Besides, any of these conjoined universals, if compound, will consist of atomic propositions linked by disjunctions and negations, and can be represented either in implicational form (replacing the disjunctions and negations with implications and negations, and possibly some other connectives) or in some other logical form -an option that is less popular in linguistics. 6 These considerations allow us to postulate the following "existence" principle:
For any linguistic n-dimensional typology with binary attributes, there exists at least one set (conjunction) of non-statistical universals of implicational (or some other) form which generates this typology (i.e., describes all and only its attested types).
Let us now turn to the typologies given in Table 1 and Table 2 . The only difference between these typologies and one having binary attributes is the non-binary nature of their dimension for Verb Order. This dimension has three attributes, viz., SVO, SOV, and VSO (or V-1), instead of only two; all other dimensions are binary. But obviously we can split up this 3-attribute dimension into three 2-attribute dimensions, SVO, SOV, and VSO (or V-1), which are now binary, as each language type will either have or lack any one of the mentioned orders. More generally, any n-dimensional typology with non-binary attributes can be transformed into one with binary attributes by increasing the number of dimensions. 7 Two speciÞc types of n-dimensional typologies deserve special mention at this point. The Þrst is the one in which ALL the types are actually attested, and the second is the one in which NONE of the types are attested. Typologies with no attested types can be regarded as non-occurring in linguistic practice, and hence ignored. The reason why such typologies are useless is simply that the 6. The details of a conversion of one logical formula into another equivalent formula will be of no great interest to a typologist. It sufÞces for the purposes of the present article that only the basic idea of our argument be grasped, or indeed only its ultimate result. Therefore, a single simple example of such a conversion will have to satisfy the more logically-minded typologist. Thus, let Universal 1 from the conjunction of universals [Universal 1 & Universal 2 & Universal 3 . . . & Universal n ] be the disjunction A ∨ B. We want to get an implicational formula from this disjunction. First, we can substitute A by its equivalent formula ∼(∼A) (by the law of double negation, A ≡ ∼(∼A)), and thus obtain ∼(∼A) ∨ B. This result then is convertible into the implication ∼A → B by the "material conditional" A → B ≡ ∼A ∨ B. 7. It is important to realize that this reduction move is only a mental operation in the construction of our argument and therefore does not involve, in any literal sense, the transformation of nonbinary to binary typologies. As a consequence, any questions naturally arising in linguistic feature theory, such as intuitiveness vs. unintuitiveness of binary typologies, the advantages and disadvantages of particular ways the reduction is achieved, etc. are completely beside the point in the present context. All that counts is the possibility of the reduction. Our illustrative examples in the next section are in fact both non-binary typologies.
properties they employ to classify languages must be irrelevant to natural languages, if indeed no language is either positively or negatively speciÞed with respect to these properties. (An example would be a typology attempting to classify languages, say, on the basis of the properties "has feathers" and "can ßy".) While typologies with no attested types have not been proposed in the literature, ones with all types attested have been. They state that any combination of linguistic properties is realized, which means that no exceptionless generalization can formulated describing such typologies. The reason why this is so can easily be understood by appealing to the familiar fact that any universal FORBIDS some co-occurrence of linguistic properties, or some type(s), but, by deÞnition, no type is forbidden in the typologies at issue. In facing such typologies with no forbidden types, which do not allow the formulation of non-statistical universals, the linguist has to look for statistical universals, if some signiÞcant statistical correlations between the languages' attributes in the typology are discernible. (A statement to the same effect, but for the more speciÞc case of two-dimensional typologies, is made by Greenberg when he says that for tetrachoric tables with four pluses "no exceptionless generalization is possible " (1978: 54) .) The above considerations, pertaining to the reducibility of typologies to binary ones and to generalizations corresponding to typologies with all/none forbidden types, allow us to reformulate our previous version of the existence principle as follows, where the phrase "n-dimensional typology with binary attributes" is replaced by "n-dimensional typology such that it has some attested and some unattested type(s)":
For any linguistic n-dimensional typology such that it has some attested and some unattested type(s), there exists at least one set (conjunction) of non-statistical universals of implicational (or some other) form which generates this typology (i.e., describes all and only its attested types). This is a fundamental descriptive principle in typology since it tells us that any typology that has some attested and some unattested types does have some description in terms of a set of exceptionless universals covering all and only the attested language types, even if we do not know exactly what this set of universals might be. The heuristic value of this "existence" principle is selfevident. Our knowledge that a solution of some pre-speciÞed format exists is, in the Þrst place, a good incentive for initiating the search for this solution. And, secondly, it will direct this search by precluding the possibility of someone trying to pass for the correct solution an object that deviates from the prespeciÞed solution's format.
It may be worth noting at this point, following Greenberg (1978: 41-49) , that not all typological work necessarily employs typologies (= classiÞcations) of the usual sort, where there is a Þnite number of mutually exclusive types (= classes), and every language relevant to the typology falls under one and only one type (class). As a result, not all typological descriptions are summarizable in terms of universals. Thus, typological characterization on the basis of continuous numerical attributes -for example, the use of morpheme-word ratio as a measure of the degree of typological synthesis (Greenberg 1954 ) -does not divide languages into mutually exclusive classes but orders them on a continuum. Indeed, if each language is assigned a number corresponding to its morphemeword ratio over a sample of texts from this language, the languages do not form classes but are ordered on a numerical continuum. This allows us only to register, say, that Inuit is more synthetic than Vietnamese, and German lies somewhere between them, but does not let us set up classes to which these languages belong. As Greenberg (1978) notes, in this case the associated generalizations involved would be statistical measures of central tendency (e.g., averages and medians, dispersion, etc.), rather than (implicational) universals. Nonetheless, if desired, continuous numerical attributes can be reduced to categorical (nominal) attributes by deÞning number intervals. This reduction results in normal typologies that obey the existence principle stated above. For example, introducing the three morpheme-word ratio intervals [< 2.00], [2.00 − 2.99], and [≥ 3.00], we introduce a dimension with three categorical attributes (corresponding to analytic, synthetic, or polysynthetic language, respectively). This dimension, possibly along with some further linguistic properties, can then be used to deÞne an n-dimensional typology for which we can assess whether or not it is describable in terms of non-statistical universals in accordance with our existence principle.
A remark is in order on the SIMPLICITY of solutions to typologies. Our descriptive principle states that there would be at least one solution, i.e., one general description, to a typology, comprising a set of (implicational) universals. If we can demonstrate that a solution is unique, then this solution is clearly the simplest. In cases where there are alternative solutions, it is natural to regard the set(s) of universals with the smallest cardinality (= size) as simplest (e.g., a set of three universals is simpler than a set of four universals). Thus, in effect, for any typology of the type we discuss, there exists one or more simplest solutions.
Insofar as Table 1 and Table 2 do not belong to the class of typologies in which all or none of the logically possible types are attested, they will have minimal accounts in terms of non-statistical universals.
We are not aware of our descriptive principle having been previously stated in the linguistic literature. In any case, it seems unlikely that it was familiar to Greenberg or Hawkins (at the time of writing), for if it had been, they would undoubtedly have found a comprehensive account of their typologies. In particular, had this principle been known to Hawkins, it would have saved him the need to relegate Types 5 and 13 to his (statistical) distributional principle even though there were universals of the non-statistical sort favored by him that would have been sufÞcient to do the job.
A method for Þnding the minimal description(s) of a typology
It is good to know that a (simplest) solution to a problem exists but it is even better if you know how to Þnd it. In this section, we propose a method of Þnd-ing the minimal description(s) of a typology in terms of a set of implicational universals. We illustrate our approach on Hawkins' typology (cf. Table 2 ).
Our method comprises the following steps:
Step 1. Find all logically nonequivalent implications holding over attested types; then associate each of these implications with the type(s) it forbids.
In order to Þnd a minimal set of universals describing a typology we Þrst need to state all universals that are valid for the data. To avoid the proliferation of generalizations potentially discoverable in the data, we may limit ourselves to Þnding only logically nonequivalent implications, as any generalization from a set of logically equivalent generalizations makes the same claim as any other. Two propositions (= universals) P and Q are said to be LOGICALLY EQUIV-ALENT if when P is true Q is also true, and when Q is true P is also true; otherwise they are LOGICALLY NONEQUIVALENT. Such equivalence between two propositions (universals) can be ascertained by drawing their truth tables and checking whether they have identical truth values in each row of their truth tables, or alternatively, by showing that P is convertible into Q by some known tautology (= law of logic).
As a familiar example, consider the universal SOV → (NG → NA), which is equivalent to Hawkins' universal (I) , viz. SOV → (AN → GN) . Their equivalence can be shown, using the logic law of contraposition: P → Q ≡ ∼Q → ∼P. Thus, under the assumption made in the typologies investigated of a basic word order for the adjective and the noun, and for the genitive and the noun, it is obvious that AN is the negation of NA (i.e., AN ≡ ∼ NA), and GN is the negation of NG (i.e., GN ≡ ∼ NG). From these facts it is easy to see how the former universal is derivable from that of Hawkins' by the appropriate substitutions. In an analogous manner, one can derive Hawkins' universal (I) from the former (for a linguistic discussion of contraposition, cf., e.g., Croft 1990: 49). For our descriptive purposes, we need to keep only one of these redundant universals.
Below we list nine logically nonequivalent implications that we found to hold for Table 2 . 8 In their formulation we use (explicitly) only the connec-8. To avoid the proliferation of redundant implications found, also excluded from this list are im-tive implication (→), although, as it should be clear from Note 4, they will be equivalent to the more transparent statements that employ conjunction as well. Each of the implications is associated with the excluded co-occurrence types:
Universal ( Step 2. Associate with any unattested type the universal(s) which exclude that type.
This step is unproblematic once we have available all the implications found at
Step 1; see Table 3 for Hawkins' Expanded Sample.
Step 3. Form a set S whose members are all sets consisting of the alternative universals excluding a type (i.e., the sets in the right-hand column of Table 3 ), and then Þnd the minimal set cover of S.
The set S will have as its members all nine sets of universals in Table 3 , i.e., S = {(II , III ), (V , VI , VIII ), (IV , VI , VIII ), (II , V ), (VII , VIII ), (V , VII , VIII ), (I ), (III , IX ), (I , IV )}.
plications that logically follow from stronger implications, such as the four-termed universal Po → (SOV → (AN → GN) ) which logically follows from Hawkins' three-termed universal (I), SOV → (AN → GN) . In general, a proposition (universal) P is said to logically imply another proposition Q if, when P is true, Q is also necessarily true. To see why Hawkins' universal logically implies the other universal, we Þrst note that Hawkins' universal is equivalent (identical) to the consequent of the latter implication. Denoting Hawkins' universal SOV → (AN → GN) by H, we therefore need to show that whenever H is true, Po → H is also true. That this is indeed the case follows from the fact that when the consequent of an implication is true, the whole implication is also necessarily true. The superßuousness of universals that are logically implied by stronger universals has long been noted in the typological literature. The standard example is the (unrestricted) universal "All languages have oral vowels" which logically implies the (implicational) universal "If a language has nasal vowels, then it also has oral vowels". Cf., e.g., Howard (1971) , Greenberg (1978: 50-51) , Comrie (1981: 18) . 9. This formulation is equivalent (by contraposition and exportation) to Hawkins' Universal (III) Pr & ∼SVO → (NA → NG), which can also be seen from the same set of types they both rule out, viz. Types 4 and 20. A COVER of a set S is called another set C which contains at least one member from each of the sets that are members of S. That is, the cover C in the above case should contain at least one member from the Þrst set (II , III ), at least one member from the second set (V , VI , VIII ), at least one member from the third set (IV , VI , VIII ), and so on for all the nine sets of universals which are members of S. We note that a cover must not contain redundant elements. It will be clear from this deÞnition that Þnding the cover of the set S will contain the universals needed to exclude ALL the nine unattested types. A MINIMAL COVER of a set S is the cover C i having the smallest cardinality (= the smallest number of members, composing C i ). The minimal cover of S will thus yield the smallest number of universals that can block all the non-attested types.
Computing the minimal covers for the set S, we get the following three minimal sets of universals, each consisting of four universals which describe all and only the attested types in Table 2 For example, account 1 uses the Þrst three of Hawkins' universals plus Universal (VIII ) ruling out, among others, the non-attested Types 5 and 13 that Hawkins had problems with. The correctness of the rest of the solutions is readily testable against the data from Table 2 and we leave this exercise to the reader. We may note that Hawkins' Universal (IV) does not actually Þgure in any one of the three simplest accounts. The reason is simply that it does not add any further information to what is already contained in any of these three accounts.
We should emphasize that, since a cover of a set does not contain redundant members (i.e., universals that are logically equivalent to or logically implied by other universals), both the minimal and non-minimal accounts above contain all and only the universals needed to describe the typology in question. That is, adding a universal to any of the accounts would result in redundancy whereas removing a universal would lead to a failure to describe the typology. This is the reason why a solution that includes, say, all nine universals found to hold in the Expanded Sample would not be a correct one; more precisely, its shortcoming will be the presence of superßuous universals.
We may now look at the accounts of Greenberg's typology in his Appendix II. At Step 1 of our method, we found the following implicational universals listed below alongside with the co-occurrence types each excludes:
Universal (1 ) VSO → Pr (Types 5, 6, 7, 8) Universal (2 ) SOV→ ( Universals (1 ) and (2 ) correspond to Greenberg's Universals 3 and 5, respectively. Hence both generalizations proposed by Greenberg should Þgure in both the simplest and non-simplest accounts of his typology, as seen from accounts 1-4. Concluding this section, a methodological remark is in order. As seen from our analyses above, both Appendix II and the Expanded Sample allow more than one simplest description (under our deÞnition of "simplest" as referring to the minimal number of universals in an account of a typology). None of the simplest solutions can be considered "better" than any other from a purely descriptive point of view as all of them are equally empirically adequate. If simplicity is the seal of truth, as the Latin saying quoted at the beginning of this article has it, then we have to concede that there exists in this case more than one solution marked with this seal.
The MINTYP program
The reader will have noticed by now that the execution of our method is not straightforward as far as Step 1 and Step 3 are concerned. The tasks deÞned by these steps are indeed quite complex computationally and hence very difÞcult to perform manually even for the relatively small typologies we are considering.
In order to execute the method proposed we have implemented the computer program MINTYP (running in SICStus Prolog under Windows). MINTYP accepts as input information such as that in Tables 1 and 2 , i.e., the deÞnitions (= co-occurrences) of all logically admissible types, alongside information about the number of languages conforming to each type. That is, the typologies are inputted to the system in the form in which they are commonly stated in linguistics.
In essence, MINTYP links two basic modules, one for discovery of universals and the other for Þnding minimal covers. Both have been previously built for the programs UNIV(ersals) and KINSHIP, respectively.
KINSHIP is capable of Þnding all minimal (or non-minimal) componential models of a kinship system, given as input the kin terms of a language with their attendant kin types. For a linguistic discussion, cf. Pericliev & Valdés-Pérez (1998a, b) ; the computational machinery, which is very general and hence usable for other linguistic (and non-linguistic) tasks, is described in detail in Valdés-Pérez & Pericliev (1997) and Valdés-Pérez et al. (2000) .
UNIV (Pericliev 1999a ) is a system that can discover logical patterns from data including both statistical and non-statistical universals as well as estimate their statistical signiÞcance (for one approach to the latter issue, see Valdés-Pérez & Pericliev 1999) . 11 11. It would be interesting to note that recently UNIV was extended with a text generation module, AUTO (AUthoring TOol), so that given a description of a set of languages in terms of MINTYP uses the two modules to execute the steps of the method outlined above. At step 1, the UNIV module is run on data compiled only from the attested types of the inputted typology to Þnd (non-redundant) implications of increasing length. Next, a subroutine is run on the data from the entire typology (i.e., attested plus non-attested types) to discover the types that are counterexamples to the implications found. The latter process identiÞes the forbidden types, which are associated with each implication forbidding them.
Step 2, comprising the association of unattested types with the universal(s) which exclude them, is unproblematic. And Þnally, at Step 3, the minimal cover module from the KINSHIP program is applied to the set consisting of all sets of universals ruling out a type to yield the minimal account(s) of a typology. (This module can optionally produce all alternative sets of universals that deÞne the typology, not only the simplest one(s).)
The algorithms we use for Þnding all (non-redundant) universals and minimal set covers are complex. They are of more interest to computer science than to linguistic typology, and thus they are beyond the scope of this article. The essential point for typologists is that the task of Þnding either a guaranteedsimplest or a non-simplest account of a typology -whether using this particular, or some other, method -is complex and would generally require a computational tool to perform it. As we have pointed out earlier, for some data-intensive tasks such as the one discussed here the difference between using and not using a computer is not just a matter of saving time and effort, but often a matter of Þnding and not Þnding a consistent solution at all. (For a general discussion of the advantages of computer-aided knowledge-acquisition in linguistics, cf. Pericliev 1999a.)
Conclusion
The contributions of this paper may be summarized as follows. We proposed a principle asserting that, for any typology with some unattested types, there exists a (simplest) set of non-statistical universals of some logical form (e.g., implications) that deÞne all and only its attested types. This was made possible some properties (currently only word order properties), as well as the discoveries of a human agent on the same data, the UNIVAUTO system can compare the human and the machine discoveries, and if judged worthy by the system, write an article in English on its discoveries. Running UNIVAUTO on Greenberg's 30-language sample, with queries requiring nonstatistical or statistical universals of type A → B to be found, the system both exhibited some infelicities in Greenberg's universals (1966) and found many novel generalizations of these types. These two sessions with AUTO resulted in texts that were submitted for publication with no further human editing (Pericliev 1999b (Pericliev , 2000 ; the Þrst paper has a postscript giving a brief description of UNIVAUTO). Thus, UNIVAUTO has produced the Þrst scientiÞc articles ever to be generated by a computer.
by building on the insightful logical analysis of linguistic typologies by Greenberg (1978) and linking his analysis to certain relevant results from propositional logic. The postulated principle allowed us to judge both Greenberg's and Hawkins' descriptions as not fully descriptively adequate, even without knowing what exactly the descriptions of their typologies would be. We also suggested a method of discovering the (minimal) description(s) of a typology in terms of implicational universals and brießy outlined the computer program MINTYP that executes this computationally costly task. Running the program on the data from Greenberg's Appendix II and Hawkins' Expanded Sample, we found the minimal (as well as the non-minimal) sets of universals deÞning all and only the attested types in these typologies and showed that each set must consist of at least four implicational universals. We also noted the existence of alternative simplest sets of universals deÞning the typologies in question.
The set of universals deÞning a typology may be viewed either as a set of grammar rules generating attested co-occurrences or as mere facts of cooccurrence that need to be explained by some theory. Under both interpretations, having a most economical description at our disposal might be a virtue. In the Þrst case, it is generally preferable to have as few grammatical rules as possible; in the second case, again, the availability of a smaller number of facts to explain is generally preferable to having a much greater number of facts to explain. Although we have focussed on Þnding guaranteed-simplest solutions, it will be clear from our discussion that Þnding ANY consistent description of a typology, be it the simplest or not, would involve a similar method to the one we described here.
Finally, a word of caution against a possible (mis)interpretation of our results as implying the superßuousness of statistical universals for the description of typologies. Indeed, one may feel tempted to claim that since for many typologies there exist set(s) of non-statistical universals deÞning these typologies, there is no place for statistical universals in this enterprise. The debate in favor or against statistical universals is a complex matter in which the arguments of advocates of either position should be carefully weighed (cf., e.g., Hawkins' 1983 defense of non-statistical universals, and Dryer's 1997 of statistical ones). This is a task beyond the scope of this study. Here, we shall have to limit ourselves to a few remarks as to why our results should NOT be conceived as downplaying the role of statistical universals.
In the Þrst place, and this is an obvious point, non-statistical universals cannot register prevailing co-occurrence tendencies or signiÞcant correlations that have a limited number of exceptions; such important facts about language are only accountable for in terms of statistical universals. Secondly, on inspecting increasingly larger databases it may eventually turn out that all of the logically possible types are actually attested; in this case, again, as mentioned earlier (Section 3), we ought to take recourse to statistical, rather than non-statistical, universals for a description of this typology. Thus, for instance, it was found that Type 4 (V-1 & Pr & NA & GN) and Type 8 (V-1 & Po & NA & GN), previously believed to be non-existent, actually occur in languages such as Kilivila and Garawa, and Yagua and Guajajara, respectively (for a discussion, cf., e.g., Dryer 1991) . If it is convincingly demonstrated that all types actually occur, we will be forced by these empirical data to replace the non-statistical descriptions of the four-dimensional typologies studied here with statistical ones. 12 And, Þ-nally, since the ultimate aim of describing typologies in terms of universals is to provide data that can be subsequently deduced from, or explained by, higherorder principles or theories, there is deÞnitely a place for statistical universals if they happen to Þt better into these higher-order explanatory frameworks than non-statistical universals do.
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